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The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

19 February 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: John J. Bird  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning  
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Reports for January 1987

1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:

NATO

A zero-zero INF accord would have several negative effects among our key NATO allies, all of whom privately have expressed strong opposition to a total withdrawal of INF from Europe. Without some constraints on SRINF and conventional forces, a zero-zero accord would be perceived as a return to a situation similar to the strategic imbalance of the mid-1970's. Another divisive security debate might incline some NATO leaders to redress a new imbalance through some sort of accommodation with Moscow rather than supporting strategic countermeasures.

Turkey

Growing tension in schools and the streets over government sanctions against Islamic fundamentalism, a growing insurgency along Turkey's southern borders, and mounting concern in Ankara over an Iranian victory in the Gulf War may portend a new era of instability.

Afghanistan/Pakistan/USSR

The community does not believe the Soviets are in a hurry to divest themselves of their Afghan venture and does not anticipate significant additional troop withdrawals. The proposals the Soviets will table at Geneva will not be so dramatic as to cause serious differences between Pakistan and ourselves. Getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan is Pakistan's priority in the peace negotiations. The Pakistanis would find it very difficult to turn

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down a 12-month timetable--or even an 18-month timetable--for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. While the Pakistanis will keep up the military pressure on the Soviets, they still have not committed themselves to building up the political side of the resistance.

### USSR

Gorbachev's effort to regain control of the regions may lead to other nationalist outbreaks similar to those in Kazakhstan. How the regime handles these outbreaks will be an important test of its ability to implement its broader domestic agenda.

### China

It is generally agreed that there will be further leadership changes in China, and that until these are accomplished over the next few months, it will be difficult to sort out the general trends. We are likely to see a new period of some instability while China again tries to resolve its leadership succession problem. Also, in spite of Chinese assurances to the contrary, the purge of Hu will have some consequences for Chinese foreign policy, particularly in affecting China's appeal to Hong Kong and Taiwan.

### Liberia

Doe may lash out at Washington as his frustrations grow, demanding greater payments for U.S. use of facilities in Liberia and possibly trying to squeeze US and other foreign concessions for payments.

### El Salvador

The extreme right and extreme left are both focusing on El Salvador's unfavorable economic prospects as President Duarte's most vulnerable point; attacks on his policies from both ends of the spectrum are likely.

### Colombia Terrorism

US personnel in Colombia are at significantly increased risk because of joint targetting by terrorists and narcotraffickers. The arrest and extradition of alleged drug trafficker Carlos Lehder will certainly generate reprisals.

## 2. Trend Commentary:

### Chad/France/Libya

Both Habre's forces and the Libyans are planning major operations once preparations are complete, probably late in February. French involvement continues to grow despite France's reluctance to engage Libyan forces directly and Chirac's fears of complicating negotiations on French hostages in

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Lebanon. France's readiness to back Habre's forces with new arms deliveries creates three possible scenarios that could pose problems for the US.

- If the French fail to respond to the prospects of a Habre defeat north of the 16th parallel, we would face a strengthened Libyan position in northern Africa.
- Conflicts with Paris could arise if the French perceive us as displacing them in Chad or if, alternatively, military reversals lead France to request more assistance than we are prepared to render.
- If the fighting begins to take a political toll at home, the French might seek a private deal with Libya that ignores U.S. interests.

#### Malta/Libya

Libya's involvement in Malta, while so far falling short of our worst fears, may increase in the run-up to the Maltese elections due in May. Qadhafi already has contributed \$150,000 to the ruling pro-Libyan Labor Party's campaign coffers.

#### Lebanon/Israel/Syria

Although Israel is unlikely to increase its presence in southern Lebanon, increasing Hizballah activity could prompt Israeli or Syrian reprisals, posing the greatest danger for U.S. interests. It appears that the Israelis are moving toward a military response, and, although Damascus would be unlikely to respond to precision bombing raids on Hizballah, it may be unable to determine whether the attacks are on Hizballah or Syrian targets.

#### Suriname

The economy will spiral downward following the Suralco closing, thereby placing the Bouterse government under considerable labor and political pressure. In order to gain influence in the area, Libyan representatives have made overtures to both sides in an attempt to be in a position to deal with whichever side eventually wins.

3. NIO/Warning notes these additional areas of continuing warning concern:

India/China--The renewed border dispute could lead to limited military clashes; missteps or overreaction by local commanders could precipitate an exchange of fire.

India/Pakistan--Despite the recent signing of a memorandum of understanding calling for a phased pull-out of troops from a sensitive area of the border by both India and Pakistan, the risk of war remains high. The NIO for Warning notes that India has so far not moved significant forces away from the critical areas. The accidental or deliberate outbreak of widespread hostilities could occur at any time with little warning.

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Philippines--The strong popular approval of the new constitution will ease political confrontations temporarily. The near-term outlook is for a rapid deepening of political polarization that will place both Aquino and Ramos in a tight spot between irreconcilable forces on left and right. Further attempts to discredit Aquino and coup plotting will mount as National Assembly elections, scheduled for May, approach.

South Korea--The recent death of a South Korean student in police custody has reinvigorated Chun's opposition and has delayed his timetable for constitutional reform. Seoul is ready to take harsher measures to prevent the opposition from capitalizing on the current mood, and the likelihood of political confrontation this spring is growing.

Haiti--One year after the departure of Duvalier, Haiti is experiencing more intense antigovernment protests and violence that could lead to the disintegration of the Namphy government sooner rather than later. March's referendum on the constitution will not alleviate this deteriorating situation; opportunities for foreign exploitation will increase.

South Africa/Frontline States--As May's parliamentary elections approach, the South African government's belligerent actions, unprecedented media restraints and massive extraconstitutional effort to suppress dissent will intensify. Externally, new South African cross-border raids are likely, and further actions by Pretoria in the frontline states will spawn an even more intractable situation. Pretoria's increasingly coercive measures against neighboring states are affording new opportunities for Soviet exploitation.

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